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ABSTRACT
Eyewear devices, such as augmented reality displays, increasingly
integrate eye tracking, but the first-person camera required to map
a user’s gaze to the visual scene can pose a significant threat to user
and bystander privacy. We present PrivacEye, a method to detect
privacy-sensitive everyday situations and automatically enable and
disable the eye tracker’s first-person camera using a mechanical
shutter. To close the shutter in privacy-sensitive situations, the
method uses a deep representation of the first-person video com-
bined with rich features that encode users’ eye movements. To
open the shutter without visual input, PrivacEye detects changes in
users’ eye movements alone to gauge changes in the “privacy level”
of the current situation. We evaluate our method on a first-person
video dataset recorded in daily life situations of 17 participants,
annotated by themselves for privacy sensitivity, and show that our
method is effective in preserving privacy in this challenging setting.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing → Interactive systems and
tools; Ubiquitous and mobile computing; Ubiquitous and
mobile devices; Human computer interaction (HCI).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Eyewear devices, such as head-mounted displays or augmented
reality glasses, have recently emerged as a new research platform
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Figure 1: Our method uses a mechanical camera shutter
(top) to preserve users’ and bystanders’ privacy with head-
mounted eye trackers. Privacy-sensitive situations are de-
tected by combining deep scene image and eye movement
features (middle) while changes in eyemovement behaviour
alone trigger the reopening of the camera shutter (bottom).
in fields such as human-computer interaction, computer vision, or
the behavioural and social sciences [Bulling and Kunze 2016]. An
ever-increasing number of these devices integrate eye tracking to
analyse attention allocation [Eriksen and Yeh 1985; Sugano et al.
2016], for computational user modelling [Fischer 2001; Itti and Koch
2001], or hands-free interaction [Hansen et al. 2003; Vertegaal et al.
2003]. Head-mounted eye tracking typically requires two cameras:
An eye camera that records a close-up video of the eye and a high-
resolution first-person (scene) camera to map gaze estimates to the
real-world scene [Kassner et al. 2014]. The scene camera poses a
serious privacy risk as it may record sensitive personal information,
such as login credentials, banking information, or text messages,
as well as infringe on the privacy of bystanders [Perez et al. 2017].
Privacy risks intensify with the unobtrusive integration of eye
tracking in ordinary glasses frames [Tonsen et al. 2017].
In the area of first-person vision, prior work identified strategies
of self-censorship [Koelle et al. 2017] that, however, are prone to
(human) misinterpretations and forgetfulness, or the accidental
neglect of social norms and legal regulations. In consequence, user
experience and comfort are decreased and the user’s mental and
emotional load increases, while sensitive personal information can
still be accidentally disclosed. Other works therefore investigated
alternative solutions, such as communicating a bystander’s privacy
preferences using short-range wireless radio [Aditya et al. 2016],
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visual markers [Schiff et al. 2007], or techniques to compromise
recordings [Harvey 2012; Truong et al. 2005]. However, all of these
methods require bystanders to take action themselves to protect
their privacy. None of these works addressed the problem at its
source, i.e. the scene camera, nor did they offer a means to protect
the privacy of both the wearer and potential bystanders.
To address this limitation, we propose PrivacEye, the first method
for privacy-preserving head-mounted eye tracking (see Figure 1).
The key idea and core novelty of our method is to detect users’
transitions into and out of privacy-sensitive everyday situations by
leveraging both cameras available on these trackers. If a privacy-
sensitive situation is detected, the scene camera is occluded by a
physical shutter. Our design choice to use a non-spoofable physical
shutter, which closes for some time and therefore provides feedback
to bystanders, is substantiated by Koelle et al., who highlight an
increased trustworthiness over LED lights on the camera or pure
software solutions [Koelle et al. 2018]. While this approach is secure
and visible to bystanders, it prohibits visual input from the scene.
Thus, our method analyses changes in the users’ eye movement be-
haviour alone to detect if they exit a privacy-sensitive situation and
then reopens the camera shutter. A naive, vision-only system could
reopen the shutter at regular intervals, e.g. every 30 seconds, to
detect whether the current situation is still privacy-sensitive. How-
ever, this approach may negatively affect perceived reliability and
increase mistrust in the system. Thus, our eye-tracking approach
promises significant advantages over a purely interval-based ap-
proach in terms of user experience and perceived trustworthiness.
Our approach is motivated by prior work that demonstrates
that eye movements are a rich source of information on a user’s
everyday activities [Bulling et al. 2011; Steil and Bulling 2015],
social interactions and current environment [Bulling et al. 2013],
or even a user’s personality traits [Hoppe et al. 2018]. In addition,
prior work showed that perceived privacy sensitivity is related
to a user’s location and activity [Hoyle et al. 2015]. We therefore
hypothesize that privacy sensitivity transitively informs a user’s
eye movements. We are the first to confirm this transitivity, which
results as a reasoned deduction from prior work.
The specific contributions of this work are three-fold: First, we
present PrivacEye, the first method that combines the analysis of
egocentric scene image features with eye movement analysis to
enable context-specific, privacy-preserving de-activation and re-
activation of a head-mounted eye tracker’s scene camera. As such,
we show a previously unconfirmed transitive relationship over the
users’ eye movements, their current activity and environment, as
well as the perceived privacy sensitivity of the situation they are in.
Second, we evaluate our method on a dataset of real-world mobile
interactions and eye movement data, fully annotated with loca-
tions, activities, and privacy sensitivity levels of 17 participants.
Third, we provide qualitative insights on the perceived social ac-
ceptability, trustworthiness, and desirability of PrivacEye, based on
semi-structured interviews, using a fully functional prototype.
2 RELATEDWORK
Research on eye tracking privacy is sparse. Thus, our work mostly
relates to previous works on (1) privacy concerns with first-person
cameras and (2) privacy enhancing methods for (wearable) cameras.
2.1 Privacy Concerns - First-Person Cameras
First-person cameras are well-suited for continuous and unobtru-
sive recordings, which causes them to be perceived as unsettling
by bystanders [Denning et al. 2014]. Both users’ and bystanders’
privacy concerns and attitudes towards head-mounted devices with
integrated cameras were found to be affected by context, situation,
usage intentions [Koelle et al. 2015], and user group [Profita et al.
2016]. Hoyle et al. showed that the presence and the number of
people in a picture, specific objects (e.g., computer displays, ATM
cards, physical documents), location, and activity affected whether
lifeloggers deemed an image “shareable” [Hoyle et al. 2014]. They
also highlighted the need for automatic privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms to detect those elements, as individual sharing decisions are
likely to be context-dependent and subjective. Their results were
partly confirmed by Price et al., who, however, found no significant
differences in sharing when a screen was present [Price et al. 2017].
Chowdhury et al. found that whether lifelogging imagery is suit-
able for sharing is (in addition to content, scenario, and location)
mainly determined by its sensitivity [Chowdhury et al. 2016]. Fer-
dous et al. proposed a set of guidelines that, among others, include
semi-automatic procedures to determine the sensitivity of captured
images according to user-provided preferences [Ferdous et al. 2017].
All highlight the privacy sensitivity of first-person recordings and
the importance of protecting user and bystander privacy.
2.2 Enhancing Privacy of First-Person Cameras
To increase the privacy of first-person cameras for bystanders, re-
searchers have suggested communicating their privacy preferences
to nearby capture devices using wireless connections as well as
mobile or wearable interfaces [Krombholz et al. 2015]. Others have
suggested preventing unauthorised recordings by compromising
the recorded imagery, e.g., using infra-red light signals [Harvey
2010; Yamada et al. 2013] or disturbing face recognition [Harvey
2012]. In contrast to our approach, these techniques all require the
bystander to take action, which might be impractical due to costs
and efforts [Denning et al. 2014].
A potential remedy are automatic, or semi-automatic approaches,
such as PlaceAvoider, a technique that allows users to “blacklist” sen-
sitive spaces, e.g., bedroom or bathroom [Templeman et al. 2014].
Similarly, ScreenAvoider allowed users to control the disclosure
of images of computer screens showing potentially private con-
tent [Korayem et al. 2016]. Erickson et al. proposed a method to
identify security risks, such as ATMs, keyboards, and credit cards,
in images captured by first-person wearable devices [Erickson et al.
2014]. However, instead of assessing the whole scene in terms of
privacy sensitivity, their systems only detected individual sensi-
tive objects. Raval et al. presented MarkIt, a computer vision-based
privacy marker framework that allowed users to use self-defined
bounding boxes and hand-gestures to restrict visibility of content
on two dimensional surfaces (e.g. white boards) or sensitive real-
world objects [Raval et al. 2014]. iPrivacy automatically detects
privacy-sensitive objects from social images users are willing to
share using deep multi-task learning [Yu et al. 2017]. It warns the
image owners what objects in the images need to be protected
before sharing and recommends privacy settings.
PrivacEye: Privacy-Preserving Head-Mounted Eye Tracking ETRA ’19, June 25–28, 2019, Denver, CO, USA
While all of these methods improved privacy, they either only
did so post-hoc, i.e. after images had already been captured, or
they required active user input. In contrast, our approach aims to
prevent potentially sensitive imagery from being recorded at all,
automatically in the background, i.e. without engaging the user.
Unlike current computer vision based approaches that work in
image space, e.g. by masking objects or faces [Raval et al. 2014;
Shu et al. 2016; Yamada et al. 2013], restricting access [Korayem
et al. 2016], or deleting recorded images post-hoc [Templeman et al.
2014], we de-activate the camera completely using a mechanical
shutter and also signal this to bystanders. Our approach is the
first to employ eye movement analysis for camera re-activation
that, unlike other sensing techniques (e.g., microphones, infra-red
cameras), does not compromise the privacy of potential bystanders.
3 DESIGN RATIONALE
PrivacEye’s design rationale is based on user and bystander goals
and expectations. In this section, we outline how PrivacEye’s design
contributes to avoiding erroneous disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion, so-called misclosures (User Goal 1), and social friction (User
Goal 2), and detail on three resultant design requirements.
3.1 Goals and Expectations
Avoid Misclosure of Sensitive Data. A user wearing smart
glasses with an integrated camera would typically do so to make
use of a particular functionality, e.g., visual navigation. However,
the device’s “always-on” characteristic causes it to capture more
than originally intended. A navigation aid would require capturing
certain landmarks for tracking and localisation. In addition, unin-
tended imagery and potentially sensitive data is captured. Ideally,
to prevent misclosures [Caine 2009], sensitive data should not be
captured. However, requiring the user to constantly monitor her
actions and environment for potential sensitive information (and
then de-activate the camera manually) might increase the workload
and cause stress. As users might be forgetful, misinterpret situa-
tions, or overlook privacy-sensitive items, automatic support from
the system would be desirable from a user’s perspective.
Avoid Social Friction. The smart glasses recording capabilities
may cause social friction if they do not provide a clear indication
whether the camera is on or off: Bystanders might even perceive de-
vice usage as a privacy threat when the camera is turned off [Koelle
et al. 2015, 2018]. In consequence, they feel uncomfortable around
such devices [Bohn et al. 2005; Denning et al. 2014; Ens et al. 2015;
Koelle et al. 2015]. Similarly, user experience is impaired when
device users feel a need for justification as they could be accused of
taking surreptitious pictures [Häkkilä et al. 2015; Koelle et al. 2018].
3.2 Design Requirements
As a consequence of these user goals there are three essential design
requirements that PrivacEye addresses: (1) The user can make use
of the camera-based functionality without the risk of misclosures
or leakage of sensitive information. (2) The system pro-actively
reacts to the presence or absence of potentially privacy-sensitive
situations and objects. (3) The camera device communicates the
recording status clearly to both user and bystander.
Scene Camera
with Fish Eye Lens
and Shutter
Eye Camera
Feather M0 Proto
to control the Shutter
BA
C D
Figure 2: PrivacEye prototype with labelled components
(B) and worn by a user with a USB-connected laptop in a
backpack (A). Detection of privacy-sensitive situations us-
ing computer vision closes the camera shutter (C), which is
reopened based on a change in the privacy detected level in
a user’s eye movements (D).
4 PRIVACEYE PROTOTYPE
Our fully functional PrivacEye prototype, shown in Figure 2, is
based on the PUPIL head-mounted eye tracker [Kassner et al. 2014]
and features one 640×480 pixel camera (the so-called “eye camera”)
that records the right eye from close proximity (30 fps), and a second
camera (1280×720 pixels, 24 fps) to record a user’s environment
(the so-called “scene camera”). The first-person camera is equipped
with a fish eye lens with a 175◦ field of view and can be closed
with a mechanical shutter. The shutter comprises a servo motor
and a custom-made 3D-printed casing, including a mechanical lid
to occlude the camera’s lens. The motor and the lid are operated via
a micro controller, namely a Feather M0 Proto. Both cameras and
the micro controller were connected to a laptop via USB. PrivacEye
further consists of two main software components: (1) detection of
privacy-sensitive situations to close the mechanical camera shutter
and (2) detection of changes in user’s eye movements that are likely
to indicate suitable points in time for reopening the camera shutter.
4.1 Detection of Privacy-Sensitive Situations
The approaches for detecting privacy-sensitive situations we evalu-
ated are (1) CNN-Direct, (2) SVM-Eye, and (3) SVM-Combined.
4.1.1 CNN-Direct. Inspired by prior work on predicting privacy-
sensitive pictures posted in social networks [Orekondy et al. 2017],
we used a pre-trained GoogleNet, a 22-layer deep convolutional
neural network [Szegedy et al. 2015]. We adapted the original
GoogleNet model for our specific prediction task by adding two
additional fully connected (FC) layers. The first layer was used to
reduce the feature dimensionality from 1024 to 68 and the second
one, a Softmax layer, to calculate the prediction scores. Output
of our model was a score for each first-person image indicating
whether the situation visible in that image was privacy-sensitive
or not. The cross-entropy loss was used to train the model. The full
network architecture is included in the supplementary material.
4.1.2 SVM-Eye. Given that eye movements are independent from
the scene camera’s shutter status, they can be used to (1) detect
privacy-sensitive situations while the camera shutter is open and
(2) detect changes in the subjective privacy level while the camera
shutter is closed. The goal of this second component is to instead
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detect changes in a user’s eye movements that are likely linked
to changes in the privacy sensitivity of the current situation and
thereby to keep the number of times the shutter is reopened as low
as possible. To detect privacy-sensitive situations and changes, we
trained SVM classifiers (kernel=rbf, C=1) with characteristic eye
movement features, which we extracted using only the eye camera
video data. We extracted a total of 52 eye movement features, cover-
ing fixations, saccades, blinks, and pupil diameter (see Table 2 in the
supplementary material for a list and description of the features).
Similar to [Bulling et al. 2011], each saccade is encoded as a char-
acter forming words of length n (wordbook). We extracted these
features using a sliding window of 30 seconds (step size of 1 sec).
4.1.3 SVM-Combined. A third approach for the detection of
privacy-sensitive situations is a hybrid method. We trained SVM
classifiers using the extracted eye movement features (52) and com-
bined them with CNN features (68) from the scene image, which we
extracted from the first fully connected layer of our trained CNN
model, creating 120 feature large samples. With the concatenation
of eye movement and scene features, we are able to extend the
information from the two previous approaches during recording
phases where the camera shutter is open.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluated the different approaches on their own and in com-
bination in a realistic temporal sequential analysis trained in a
person-specific (leave-one-recording-out) and person-independent
(leave-one-person-out) manner. We assume that the camera shutter
is open at start up. If no privacy-sensitive situation is detected, the
camera shutter remains open and the current situation is rated
“non-sensitive”, otherwise, the camera shutter is closed and the cur-
rent situation is rated “privacy-sensitive”. Finally, we analysed error
cases and investigated the performance of PrivacEye in different
environments and activities.
5.1 Dataset
While an ever-increasing number of eye movement datasets have
been published in recent years (see [Bulling et al. 2012, 2011; Hoppe
et al. 2018; Steil and Bulling 2015; Sugano and Bulling 2015] for
examples), none of them focused on privacy-related attributes. We
therefore make resource to a previously recorded dataset [Steil et al.
2018]. The dataset of Steil et al. contains more than 90 hours of
data recorded continuously from 20 participants (six females, aged
22-31) over more than four hours each. Participants were students
with different backgrounds and subjects with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. During the recordings, participants roamed a
university campus and performed their everyday activities, such
as meeting people, eating, or working as they normally would
on any day at the university. To obtain some data from multiple,
and thus also “privacy-sensitive”, places on the university campus,
participants were asked to not stay in one place for more than 30
minutes. Participants were further asked to stop the recording after
about one and a half hours so that the laptop’s battery packs could
be changed and the eye tracker re-calibrated. This yielded three
recordings of about 1.5 hours per participant. Participants regularly
interacted with a mobile phone provided to them and were also
encouraged to use their own laptop, desktop computer, or music
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P01 66 65 180 38 23 662
P02 3 150 4765
P03 24 56 2 86 18 889
P05 9 105 12 14 8733 2
P07 5 13 60 46 1562
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(non-sensitive)
41 2 6 75
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Figure 3: Privacy sensitivity levels rated on a 7-pt Likert
scale from 1: fully inappropriate (i.e., privacy-sensitive) to
7: fully appropriate (i.e., non-sensitive). Distribution in la-
belled minutes/level per participant, sorted according to a
“cut-off” between closed shutter (level 1-2) and open shutter
(level 3-7). In practice, the “cut-off” level could be chosen ac-
cording to individual ratings as measured by PAQ.
player if desired. The dataset thus covers a rich set of representative
real-world situations, including sensitive environments and tasks.
The data collection was performed with the same equipment as
shown in Figure 2 excluding the camera shutter.
5.2 Data Annotation
The dataset was fully annotated by the participants themselves
with continuous annotations of location, activity, scene content,
and subjective privacy sensitivity level. 17 out of the 20 participants
finished the annotation of their own recording resulting in about
70 hours of annotated video data. They again gave informed con-
sent and completed a questionnaire on demographics, social media
experience and sharing behaviour (based on Hoyle et al. [Hoyle
et al. 2014]), general privacy attitudes, as well as other-contingent
privacy [Baruh and Cemalcılar 2014] and respect for bystander
privacy [Price et al. 2017]. General privacy attitudes were assessed
using the Privacy Attitudes Questionnaire (PAQ), a modified Westin
Scale [Westin 2003] as used by [Caine 2009; Price et al. 2017].
Annotations were performed using Advene [Aubert et al. 2012].
Participants were asked to annotate continuous video segments
showing the same situation, environment, or activity. They could
also introduce new segments in case a privacy-relevant feature
in the scene changed, e.g., when a participant switched to a sen-
sitive app on the mobile phone. Participants were asked to anno-
tate each of these segments according to the annotation scheme
(see supplementary material). Privacy sensitivity was rated on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (fully inappropriate) to 7 (fully
appropriate). As we expected our participants to have difficulties
understanding the concept of “privacy sensitivity”, we rephrased it
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Figure 4: Person-specific leave-one-recording-out evaluation showing the achieved accuracy (a) and the time between camera
shutter closings (b) across different closed camera shutter intervals.
for the annotation to “How appropriate is it that a camera is in the
scene?”. Figure 3 visualises the labelled privacy sensitivity levels
for each participant. Based on the latter distribution, we pooled
ratings of 1 and 2 in the class “privacy-sensitive”, and all others in
the class “non-sensitive”. A consumer system would provide the
option to choose this “cut-off”. We will use these two classes for all
evaluations and discussions that follow in order to show the effec-
tiveness of our proof-of-concept system. The dataset is available at
https://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/MPIIPrivacEye/.
5.3 Sequential Analysis
To evaluate PrivacEye, we applied the three proposed approaches
separately as well as in combination in a realistic temporal se-
quential analysis, evaluating the system as a whole within person-
specific (leave-one-recording-out) and person-independent (leave-
one-person-out) cross validation schemes. Independent of CNN
or SVM approaches, we first trained and then tested in a person-
specific fashion. That is, we trained on two of the three recordings
of each participant and tested on the remaining one – iteratively
over all combinations and averaging the performance results in
the end. For the leave-one-person-out cross validation, we trained
on the data of 16 participants and tested on the remaining one.
SVM-Eye is the only one of the three proposed approaches that
allows PrivacEye to be functional when no scene imagery is avail-
able, i.e., when the shutter is closed. Additionally, it can be applied
when the shutter is open thus serving both software components
of PrivacEye. While the camera shutter is not closed, i.e., scene
imagery is available, CNN-Direct or SVM-Combined can be applied.
To provide a comprehensive picture, we then analysed the combi-
nations CNN-Direct + SVM-Eye (CNN/SVM) and SVM-Combined +
SVM-Eye (SVM/SVM). The first approach is applied when the cam-
era shutter is open and SVM-Eye only when the shutter is closed.
For the sake of completeness, we also evaluated SVM-Combined
and CNN-Direct on the whole dataset. However, these two methods
represent hypothetical best-case scenarios in which eye and scene
features are always available. As this is in practice not possible, they
have to be viewed as an upper-bound baseline. For evaluation pur-
poses, we apply the proposed approaches within a step size of one
second in a sequential manner. The previously predicted camera
shutter position (open or close) decides which approach is applied
for the prediction of the current state to achieve realistic results.
We use Accuracy = T P+T NT P+F P+T N+FN , where TP, FP, TN, and FN
count sample-based true positives, false positives, true negatives,
and false negatives, as performance indicator.
5.3.1 CNN-Direct. For training the CNN, which classifies a given
scene image directly as privacy-sensitive or non-sensitive, we split
the data from each participant into segments. Each change in envi-
ronment, activity, or the annotated privacy sensitivity level starts a
new segment. We used one random image per segment for training.
5.3.2 SVM-Eye and SVM-Combined. The SVM classifiers use only
eye movement features (SVM-Eye) or the combination of eye move-
ment and CNN features (SVM-Combined). We standardised the
training data (zero mean, unit variance) for the person-specific and
leave-one-person-out cross validation before training the classifiers,
and used the same parameters for the test data.
5.4 Results
With potential usability implications in mind, we evaluate per-
formance over a range of closed camera shutter intervals. If a
privacy-sensitive situation is detected from the CNN-Direct or SVM-
Combined approach, the camera shutter is kept closed for an interval
between 1 and 60 seconds. If SVM-Eye is applied and no privacy
change is detected, the shutter remains closed. In a practical ap-
plication, users build more trust when the camera shutter remains
closed, at least for a sufficient amount of time, to guarantee the
protection of privacy-sensitive scene content when such a situa-
tion is detected [Koelle et al. 2018]. We also evaluated CNN-Direct
and SVM-Combined on the whole recording as hypothetical best-
case scenarios. However, comparing their performance against the
combinations SVM/SVM and CNN/SVM illustrate the performance
improvement using SVM-Eye when the camera shutter is closed.
5.4.1 Person-specific (leave-one-recording-out) evaluation. Fig-
ure 4a shows the person-specific accuracy performance of Privac-
Eye against increasing camera shutter closing time for two combina-
tions CNN/SVM and SVM/SVM, and SVM-Eye, which can be applied
independent of the camera shutter status. Besides CNN-Direct and
SVM-Combined, the majority class classifier serves as a baseline,
predicting the majority class from the training set. The results re-
veal that all trained approaches and combinations perform above
the majority class classifier. However, we can see that CNN-Direct
and its combination with SVM-Eye (CNN/SVM) perform below the
other approaches and below the majority class classifier for longer
closed camera shutter intervals. SVM-Eye and SVM-Combined per-
form quite robustly, around 70% accuracy, while SVM-Eye performs
better for shorter intervals and SVM-Combined for longer intervals.
The interplay approach SVM/SVM, which we would include in our
prototype, exceeds 73% with a closed camera shutter interval of
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Figure 5: Person-independent leave-one-person-out evaluation showing the accuracy results (a) and the time between closing
the camera shutter (b) across different closed camera shutter intervals.
one second and outperforms all other combinations in terms of
accuracy in all other intervals. One reason for the performance
improvement of SVM/SVM in comparison to its single components
is that SVM-Combined performs better for the detection of privacy-
sensitive situations when the camera shutter is open while SVM-Eye
performs better for preserving privacy-sensitive situations so that
the camera shutter remains closed. Another aim of our proposed
approach is the reduction of opening and closing events during a
recording to strengthen reliability and trustworthiness. A compar-
ison of Figure 4a and Figure 4b renders a clear trade-off between
accuracy performance and time between camera shutter closing
instances. For very short camera shutter closing times the SVM-Eye
approach, which only relies on eye movement features from the eye
camera, shows the best performance, whereas for longer camera
shutter closing times, the combination SVM/SVM shows better ac-
curacy with a comparable amount of time between camera shutter
closing instances. However, the current approaches are actually
not able to reach the averaged ground truth of about 8.2 minutes
between camera shutter closings.
5.4.2 Person-independent (leave-one-person-out) evaluation. The
more challenging task, which assumes that privacy-sensitivity
could generalise over multiple participants, is given in the person-
independent leave-one-person-out cross validation of Figure 5a.
Similar to the person-specific evaluation, CNN-Direct and CNN/SVM
perform worse than the other approaches. Here, SVM-Eye out-
performs SVM-Combined and SVM/SVM. However, none of the
approaches are able to outperform the majority classifier. These
results show that eye movement features generalise better over mul-
tiple participants to detect privacy-sensitive situations than scene
image information. Comparing the number of minutes between
camera shutter closing events of person-specific and leave-one-
person-out in Figure 4b and Figure 5b, the person-specific approach
outperforms the person-independent leave-one-person-out evalua-
tion scheme for each approach. This shows that privacy sensitivity
does not fully generalise, and consumer systems would require a
person-specific calibration and online learning.
5.5 Error Case Analysis
For PrivacEye, it is not only important to detect the privacy-
sensitive situations (TP), but equally important to detect non-
sensitive situations (TN), which are relevant to grant a good user
experience. Our results suggest that the combination SVM/SVM
performs best for the person-specific case. For this setting we carry
out a detailed error case analysis of our system for the participants’
open shutterclosed shutter
3fully inappropriate
(privacy-sensitive) Neutral
fully appropriate
(non-sensitive)
41 2 6 75 False Positive (FP)
False Negative (FN)
True Positive (TP)
True Negative (TN)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%20%40%60%80%
GT Password Entry  
GT Social Interaction
Predictions Social Interaction TP FP  TN FN
GT Walking
Predictions Walking TP FP  TN FN
GT Eating/Drinking
Predictions Eating/Drinking TP FP  TN FN
GT Media Interaction
Predictions Media Interaction TP FP  TN FN
GT Others
Predictions Others TP FP  TN FN
GT Reading
Predictions Reading TP FP  TN FN
5.2/30.5h
(17.0% FN)
0.5h/5.6h
(8.9% FN)
1.2h/4.5h 
(26.6% FN)
1.2h/14.1h 
(8.5% FN)
1.0/4.6h
(21.7% FN)
1.3h/6.8h 
(19.1% FN) 
10.7/17min
(63% FN)
Predictions Password Entry TP  TN FN
Activities
Figure 6: Error case analysis for different and activities
showing the “cut-off” between closed shutter (left, privacy-
sensitive) and open shutter (right, non-sensitive) with Pri-
vacEye prediction and the corresponding ground truth (GT).
False positives (FP) are non-sensitive but protected (closed
shutter), false negatives (FN) are privacy-sensitive but unpro-
tected (open shutter).
different activities. For the activities outlined in Figure 6, PrivacEye
works best while eating/drinking and in media interactions. Also,
the results are promising for detecting social interactions. The per-
formance for password entry, however, is still limited. Although
the results show that it is possible to detect password entry, the
amount of true negatives (TN) is high compared to other activities.
This is likely caused by the dataset’s under-representation of this
activity, which characteristically lasts only a few seconds. Future
work might be able to eliminate this by specifically training for
password and PIN entry, which will enable the classifier to better
distinguish between PIN entry and, e.g., reading. In the supplemen-
tary material we provide an in-depth error case analysis to further
investigate error cases in different environments.
6 USER FEEDBACK
Collecting initial subjective feedback during early stages of system
development allows us to put research concepts in a broader context
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and helps to shape hypotheses for future quantitative user studies.
In this section, we report on a set of semi-structured one-to-one
interviews on the use of head-worn augmented reality displays in
general, and our interaction design and prototype in particular. To
obtain the user feedback, we recruited 12 new and distinct partici-
pants (six females), aged 21 to 31 years (M=24, SD=3) from the local
student population. They were enrolled in seven highly diverse ma-
jors, ranging from computer science and biology to special needs
education. We decided to recruit students, given that we believe
they and their peers are potential users of a future implementation
of our prototype. We acknowledge that this sample, consisting of
rather well educated young adults (with six of them having obtained
a Bachelor’s degree), is not representative for the general popula-
tion. Interviews lasted about half an hour and participants received
a 5 Euro Amazon voucher. We provide a detailed interview pro-
tocol as part of the supplementary material. The semi-structured
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for later analy-
sis. Subsequently, qualitative analysis was performed following
inductive category development [Mayring 2014]. Key motives and
reoccurring themes were extracted and are presented in this section,
where we link back to PrivacEye’s design and discuss implications
for future work.
6.1 User Views on Transparency
Making it transparent (using the 3D-printed shutter), whether the
camera was turned on or off, was valued by all participants. Seven
participants found the integrated shutter increased perceived safety
in contrast to current smart glasses; only few participants stated
that they made no difference between the shutter and other visual
feedback mechanisms, e.g. LEDs (n=2). Several participants noted
that the physical coverage increased trustworthiness because it
made the system more robust against hackers (concerns:hacking,
n=3) than LEDs. Concluding, the usage of physical occlusion could
increase perceived safety and, thus, could be considered an op-
tion for future designs. Participants even noted that the usage of
the shutter as reassuring as pasting up a laptop camera (laptop
comparison, n=4), which is common practice.
6.2 User Views on Trustworthiness
In contrast, participants also expressed technology scepticism, par-
ticularly that the systemmight secretly record audio (concerns:audio,
n=5) or malfunction (concerns:malfunction, n=4). With the increas-
ing power of deep neural networks malfunctions, system failures, or
inaccuracies will be addressable in the future, interaction designers
will have to address this fear of “being invisibly audio-recorded”. A
lack of knowledge about eye tracking on both the user’s and the
bystander’s side might even back this misconception. Therefore,
future systems using eye tracking for context recognition will have
to clearly communicate their modus operandi.
6.3 Perceived Privacy of Eye Tracking
The majority of participants claimed to have no privacy concerns
about smart glasses with integrated eye tracking functionality: “I
do see no threat to my privacy or the like from tracking my eye
movements; this [the eye tracking] would rather be something which
could offer a certain comfort.” (P11) Only two participants expressed
concerns about their privacy, e.g., due to fearing eye-based emotion
recognition (P3). One was uncodeable. This underlines our assump-
tion that eye tracking promises privacy-preserving and socially
acceptable sensing in head-mounted augmented reality devices and,
thus, should be further explored.
6.4 Desired Level of Control
Participants were encouraged to elaborate onwhether the recording
status should be user-controlled or system-controlled. P10 notes:
“I’d prefer if it was automatic, because if it is not automatic, then the
wearer can forget to do that [de-activating the camera]. Or maybe
he will say ‘Oh, I do not want to do that’ and then [...] that leads
to a conflict. So better is automatic, to avoid questions.” Four other
participants also preferred the camera to be solely controlled by
the system (control:automatic, n=4). Their preference is motivated
by user forgetfulness (n=5), and potential non-compliance of users
(in the bystander use case, n=1). Only two participants expressed a
preference for sole (control:manual) control, due to an expected lack
of system reliability, and technical feasibility. Two responses were
uncodable. All other participants requested to implement manual
confirmation of camera de-activation/re-activation or manual op-
eration as alternative modes (control:mixed, n=4), i.e., they like to
feel in control. To meet these user expectations, future interaction
designs would have to find an adequate mix of user control and auto-
matic support through the system; for example, by enabling users to
explicitly record sensitive information (e.g. in cases of emergency)
or label seemingly non-sensitive situations “confidential”.
7 DISCUSSION
We discuss PrivacEye in light of the aforementioned design and
user requirements and results of the technical evaluation.
7.1 Privacy Preserving Device Behaviour
Design Requirements 1 and 2 demand privacy-preserving device
behaviour. With PrivacEye, we have presented a computer vision
routine that analyses all imagery obtained from the scene camera,
combined with eye movement features with regard to privacy sen-
sitivity and, in case a situation requires protection, the ability to
de-activate the scene camera and close the system’s camera shutter.
This approach prevents both accidental misclosure and malicious
procurance (e.g. hacking) of sensitive data, as has been positively
highlighted by our interview participants. However, closing the
shutter comes at the cost of having the scene camera unavailable for
sensing after it has been de-activated. PrivacEye solves this problem
by using a second eye camera that allows us, in contrast to prior
work, to locate all required sensing hardware on the user’s side.
With PrivacEye we have provided proof-of-concept that context-
dependent re-activation of a first-person scene camera is feasible
using only eye movement data. Future work will be able to build
upon these findings and further explore eye tracking as a sensor for
privacy-enhancing technologies. Furthermore, our results provide
first prove that there is indeed a transitive relationship over privacy
sensitivity and a user’s eye movements.
7.2 Defining Privacy Sensitivity
Prior work indicates that the presence of a camera may be per-
ceived appropriate or inappropriate depending on social context,
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location, or activity [Hoyle et al. 2015, 2014; Price et al. 2017]. How-
ever, related work does, to the best of our knowledge, not provide
any insights on eye tracking data in this context. For this reason,
we run a dedicated data collection and ground truth annotation.
Designing a practicable data collection experiment requires the
overall time spent by a participant for data recording and annota-
tion to be reduced to a reasonable amount. Hence, we made use of
an already collected data set, and re-invited the participants only
for the annotation task. While the pre-existing data set provided a
rich diversity of privacy-sensitive locations and objects, including
smart phone interaction, and realistically depicts everyday student
life, it is most likely not applicable to other contexts, e.g., industrial
work or medical scenarios.
For PrivacEye, we rely on a 17-participant-large, ground truth
annotated dataset with highly realistic training data. Thus, the
collected training data cannot be fully generalised, e.g., to other
regions or age groups. On the plus side, however, this data already
demonstrates that in a future real-world application, sensitivity
ratings may vary largely between otherwise similar participants.
This might also be affected by their (supposedly) highly individual
definition of “privacy”. Consequently, a future consumer system
should be pre-trained and then adapted online, based on person-
alised retraining after user feedback. In addition, users should be
enabled to select their individual “cut-off”, i.e., the level from which
a recording is blocked, which was set to “2” for PrivacEye. Future
users of consumer devices might choose more rigorous or relaxed
“cut-off” levels depending on their personal preference. Initial user
feedback also indicated that an interaction design that combines au-
tomatic, software-controlled de- and re-activation, with conscious
control of the camera by the user, could be beneficial.
7.3 Eye Tracking for Privacy-Enhancement
Eye tracking is advantageous for bystander privacy given that it
only senses users and their eye movements. In contrast to, e.g.,
microphones or infra-red sensing, it senses a bystander and/or an
environment only indirectly via the user’s eye motion or reflec-
tions. Furthermore, eye tracking allows for implicit interaction and
is non-invasive, and we expect it to become integrated into com-
mercially available smart glasses in the near future. On the other
hand, as noted by Liebling and Preibusch [Liebling and Preibusch
2014; Preibusch 2014], eye tracking data is a scare resource, which
can be used to identify user attributes like age, gender, health, or
user’s current task. For this reason, the collection and use of eye
tracking data could be perceived as a potential threat to user pri-
vacy. However, our interviews showed that eye tracking was not
perceived as problematic by a large majority of our participants.
Nevertheless, eye tracking data must be protected by appropriate
privacy policies and data hygiene.
To use our proposed hardware prototype in a real-world sce-
nario, data sampling and analysis need to run on a mobile phone.
The CNN feature extraction is currently the biggest computational
bottleneck, but could be implemented in hardware to allow for real-
time operation (c.f., Qualcom’s Snapdragon 845). Further, we believe
that a consumer system should provide an accuracy >90% which
could be achieved using additional sensors such as GPS or inertial
tracking. However, presenting the first approach for automatic de-
and re-activation of a first-person camera that achieves ∼73% with
competitive performance to ScreenAvoider (54.2 - 77.7%) [Korayem
et al. 2014] and iPrivacy (∼75%) [Yu et al. 2017], which are restricted
to scene content protection and post-hoc privacy protection, we
provide a solid basis for follow up work. We note that a general-
ized person-independent model for privacy sensitivity protection
is desirable. For this work only the participants themselves labelled
their own data. Aggregated labels of multiple annotators would
result in a more consistent and generalizable “consensus” model
and improve test accuracy, but would dilute the measure of per-
ceived privacy sensitivity, which is highly subjective [Price et al.
2017]. Specifically, similar activities and environments were judged
differently by the individual participants, as seen in Figure 3. The
availability of this information is a core contribution of our dataset.
7.4 Communicating Privacy Protection
The interaction design of PrivacEye tackles Design Requirement
3 using a non-transparent shutter. Ens et al. [Ens et al. 2015] re-
ported that the majority of their participants expected to feel more
comfortable around a wearable camera device if it clearly indicated
to be turned on or off. Hence, our proposed interaction design
aims to improve a bystander’s awareness of the recording status
by employing an eye metaphor. Our prototype implements the “eye
lid” as a retractable shutter made from non-transparent material:
open when the camera is active, closed when the camera is inac-
tive. Thus, the metaphor mimics “being watched” by the camera.
The “eye lid” shutter ensures that bystanders can comprehend the
recording status without prior knowledge, as eye metaphors have
been widely employed for interaction design, e.g., to distinguish
visibility or information disclosure [Motti and Caine 2016; Pousman
et al. 2004; Schlegel et al. 2011] or to signal user attention [Chan and
Minamizawa 2017]. Furthermore, in contrast to visual status indica-
tors, such as point lights (LEDs), physical occlusion is non-spoofable
(c.f., [Denning et al. 2014; Portnoff et al. 2015]). This concept has
been highly appreciated during our interviews, which is why we
would recommend adopting it for future hardware designs.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed PrivacEye, a method that combines
first-person computer vision with eye movement analysis to enable
context-specific, privacy-preserving de-activation and re-activation
of a head-mounted eye tracker’s scene camera. We have evaluated
our method quantitatively on a 17-participant dataset of fully an-
notated everyday behaviour as well as qualitatively, by collecting
subjective user feedback from 12 potential future users. To the best
of our knowledge, our method is the first of its kind and prevents
potentially sensitive imagery from being recorded at all, without
the need for active user input. As such, we believe the method opens
up a new and promising direction for future work in head-mounted
eye tracking, the importance of which will only increase with fur-
ther miniaturisation and integration of eye tracking in head-worn
devices or even in normal glasses frames.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was funded, in part, by a JST CREST research grant under
Grant No.: JPMJCR14E1, Japan.
PrivacEye: Privacy-Preserving Head-Mounted Eye Tracking ETRA ’19, June 25–28, 2019, Denver, CO, USA
REFERENCES
Paarijaat Aditya, Rijurekha Sen, Peter Druschel, Seong Joon Oh, Rodrigo Benenson,
Mario Fritz, Bernt Schiele, Bobby Bhattacharjee, and Tong Tong Wu. 2016. I-
pic: A platform for Privacy-compliant Image Capture. In Annual International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services (MobiSys). ACM, 235–248.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2906388.2906412
Olivier Aubert, Yannick Prié, and Daniel Schmitt. 2012. Advene As a Tailorable
Hypervideo Authoring Tool: A Case Study. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Sym-
posium on Document Engineering (DocEng ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 79–82.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2361354.2361370
Lemi Baruh and Zeynep Cemalcılar. 2014. It is more than personal: Development
and validation of a multidimensional privacy orientation scale. Personality and
Individual Differences 70 (2014), 165–170. https://doi.org/DOI:10.1016/j.paid.2014.
06.042
Jürgen Bohn, Vlad Coroamă, Marc Langheinrich, Friedemann Mattern, and Michael
Rohs. 2005. Social, economic, and ethical implications of ambient intelligence and
ubiquitous computing. In Ambient Intelligence. Springer, 5–29. https://doi.org/10.
1007/3-540-27139-2_2
Andreas Bulling and Kai Kunze. 2016. Eyewear Computers for Human-Computer
Interaction. ACM Interactions 23, 3 (2016), 70–73. https://doi.org/10.1145/2912886
Andreas Bulling, Jamie A. Ward, and Hans Gellersen. 2012. Multimodal Recognition
of Reading Activity in Transit Using Body-Worn Sensors. ACM Transactions on
Applied Perception 9, 1 (2012), 2:1–2:21. https://doi.org/10.1145/2134203.2134205
Andreas Bulling, Jamie A. Ward, Hans Gellersen, and Gerhard Tröster. 2011. Eye
Movement Analysis for Activity Recognition Using Electrooculography. IEEE
Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 33, 4 (April 2011), 741–753.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2010.86
Andreas Bulling, ChristianWeichel, andHansGellersen. 2013. EyeContext: Recognition
of High-level Contextual Cues from Human Visual Behaviour. In Proc. ACM SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI). 305–308. https://doi.
org/10.1145/2470654.2470697
Kelly Caine. 2009. Exploring everyday privacy behaviors and misclosures. Georgia
Institute of Technology.
Liwei Chan and Kouta Minamizawa. 2017. FrontFace: Facilitating Communication
BetweenHMDUsers andOutsiders Using Front-facing-screenHMDs. In Proceedings
of the 19th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile
Devices and Services (MobileHCI ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 22, 5 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3098279.3098548
Soumyadeb Chowdhury, Md Sadek Ferdous, and Joemon M Jose. 2016. Exploring
Lifelog Sharing and Privacy. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing: Adjunct (UbiComp ’16). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 553–558. https://doi.org/10.1145/2968219.2968320
Tamara Denning, Zakariya Dehlawi, and Tadayoshi Kohno. 2014. In situ with By-
standers of Augmented Reality Glasses: Perspectives on Recording and Privacy-
mediating Technologies. In Proceedings of the Conference on Human Factors in Com-
puting Systems (CHI). ACM, 2377–2386. https://doi.org/10.1145/2556288.2557352
Barrett Ens, Tovi Grossman, Fraser Anderson, Justin Matejka, and George Fitzmaurice.
2015. Candid interaction: Revealing hidden mobile and wearable computing activi-
ties. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software
& Technology. ACM, 467–476. https://doi.org/10.1145/2807442.2807449
Zackory Erickson, Jared Compiano, and Richard Shin. 2014. Neural Networks for
Improving Wearable Device Security. (2014).
Charles W Eriksen and Yei-yu Yeh. 1985. Allocation of attention in the visual field.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 11, 5 (1985),
583. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.11.5.583
Md Sadek Ferdous, Soumyadeb Chowdhury, and Joemon M Jose. 2017. Analysing
privacy in visual lifelogging. Pervasive and Mobile Computing (2017). https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.pmcj.2017.03.003
Gerhard Fischer. 2001. User modeling in human–computer interaction. User model-
ing and user-adapted interaction 11, 1-2 (2001), 65–86. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:
1011145532042
Jonna Häkkilä, Farnaz Vahabpour, Ashley Colley, Jani Väyrynen, and Timo Koskela.
2015. Design Probes Study on User Perceptions of a Smart Glasses Concept. In
Proceedings of the 14th International Conference onMobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia
(MUM ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 223–233. https://doi.org/10.1145/2836041.
2836064
John Paulin Hansen, Anders Sewerin Johansen, Dan Witzner Hansen, Kenji Itoh, and
Satoru Mashino. 2003. Command without a click: Dwell time typing by mouse
and gaze selections. In Proceedings of Human-Computer Interaction–INTERACT.
121–128.
Adam Harvey. 2010. Camoflash-anti-paparazzi clutch. (2010). http://ahprojects.com/
projects/camoflash/ accessed 13/09/2017.
Adam Harvey. 2012. CVDazzle: Camouflage from Computer Vision. Technical report
(2012).
Sabrina Hoppe, Tobias Loetscher, Stephanie Morey, and Andreas Bulling. 2018. Eye
Movements During Everyday Behavior Predict Personality Traits. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience 12 (2018). https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00105
Roberto Hoyle, Robert Templeman, Denise Anthony, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia.
2015. Sensitive lifelogs: A privacy analysis of photos from wearable cameras. In
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM conference on human factors in computing
systems. ACM, 1645–1648. https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702183
Roberto Hoyle, Robert Templeman, Steven Armes, Denise Anthony, David Crandall,
and Apu Kapadia. 2014. Privacy Behaviors of Lifeloggers using Wearable Cameras.
In International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (Ubicomp).
ACM, 571–582. https://doi.org/10.1145/2632048.2632079
Laurent Itti and Christof Koch. 2001. Computational modelling of visual attention.
Nature reviews neuroscience 2, 3 (2001), 194. https://doi.org/10.1038/35058500
Moritz Kassner, William Patera, and Andreas Bulling. 2014. Pupil: an open source
platform for pervasive eye tracking and mobile gaze-based interaction. In Adj. Proc.
UbiComp. 1151–1160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2641695
Marion Koelle, Wilko Heuten, and Susanne Boll. 2017. Are You Hiding It?: Usage Habits
of Lifelogging CameraWearers. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI ’17). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article 80, 8 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3098279.3122123
Marion Koelle, Matthias Kranz, and Andreas Möller. 2015. Don’t look at me that way!:
Understanding User Attitudes Towards Data Glasses Usage. In Proceedings of the
17th international conference on human-computer interaction with mobile devices
and services. ACM, 362–372. https://doi.org/10.1145/2785830.2785842
Marion Koelle, Katrin Wolf, and Susanne Boll. 2018. Beyond LED Status Lights-Design
Requirements of Privacy Notices for Body-worn Cameras. In Proceedings of the
Twelfth International Conference on Tangible, Embedded, and Embodied Interaction.
ACM, 177–187. https://doi.org/10.1145/3173225.3173234
Mohammed Korayem, Robert Templeman, Dennis Chen, David Crandall, and Apu Ka-
padia. 2014. Screenavoider: Protecting computer screens from ubiquitous cameras.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.0008 (2014).
Mohammed Korayem, Robert Templeman, Dennis Chen, David Crandall, and Apu
Kapadia. 2016. Enhancing lifelogging privacy by detecting screens. In Proceedings of
the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 4309–4314.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702183
Katharina Krombholz, Adrian Dabrowski, Matthew Smith, and Edgar Weippl. 2015. Ok
glass, leave me alone: towards a systematization of privacy enhancing technologies
for wearable computing. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
Data Security. Springer, 274–280. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48051-9_20
Daniel J Liebling and Sören Preibusch. 2014. Privacy considerations for a pervasive
eye tracking world. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference
on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing: Adjunct Publication. ACM, 1169–1177.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2641688
Philipp Mayring. 2014. Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic proce-
dures and software solution. 143 pages.
Vivian Genaro Motti and Kelly Caine. 2016. Towards a Visual Vocabulary for Privacy
Concepts. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual
Meeting, Vol. 60. SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA, 1078–1082. https:
//doi.org/10.1177/1541931213601249
Tribhuvanesh Orekondy, Bernt Schiele, andMario Fritz. 2017. Towards a Visual Privacy
Advisor: Understanding and Predicting Privacy Risks in Images. In International
Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV 2017). Venice, Italy. https://doi.org/10.1109/
ICCV.2017.398
Alfredo J Perez, Sherali Zeadally, and Scott Griffith. 2017. Bystanders’ Privacy. IT
Professional 19, 3 (2017), 61–65. https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2017.42
Rebecca S Portnoff, Linda N Lee, Serge Egelman, Pratyush Mishra, Derek Leung, and
David Wagner. 2015. Somebody’s watching me?: Assessing the effectiveness of
Webcam indicator lights. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 1649–1658. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2702123.2702611
Zachary Pousman, Giovanni Iachello, Rachel Fithian, Jehan Moghazy, and John Stasko.
2004. Design iterations for a location-aware event planner. Personal and Ubiquitous
Computing 8, 2 (2004), 117–125. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-004-0266-y
Sören Preibusch. 2014. Eye-tracking. Privacy interfaces for the next ubiquitous
modality. In 2014 W3C Workshop on Privacy and User-Centric Controls. https:
//www.w3.org/2014/privacyws/pp/Preibusch.pdf
Blaine A. Price, Avelie Stuart, Gul Calikli, Ciaran Mccormick, Vikram Mehta, Luke
Hutton, Arosha K. Bandara, Mark Levine, and Bashar Nuseibeh. 2017. Logging
You, Logging Me: A Replicable Study of Privacy and Sharing Behaviour in Groups
of Visual Lifeloggers. Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol. 1, 2,
Article 22 (June 2017), 18 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3090087
Halley Profita, Reem Albaghli, Leah Findlater, Paul Jaeger, and Shaun K Kane. 2016.
The AT Effect: How Disability Affects the Perceived Social Acceptability of Head-
Mounted Display Use. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems. ACM, 4884–4895. https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858130
Nisarg Raval, Animesh Srivastava, Kiron Lebeck, Landon Cox, and Ashwin Machanava-
jjhala. 2014. Markit: Privacy markers for protecting visual secrets. In Proceedings of
the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing:
Adjunct Publication. ACM, 1289–1295. https://doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2641707
Jeremy Schiff, Marci Meingast, Deirdre K Mulligan, Shankar Sastry, and Ken Goldberg.
2007. Respectful cameras: Detecting visual markers in real-time to address privacy
ETRA ’19, June 25–28, 2019, Denver, CO, USA Julian Steil, Marion Koelle, Wilko Heuten, Susanne Boll, and Andreas Bulling
concerns. In Intelligent Robots and Systems, 2007. IROS 2007. IEEE/RSJ International
Conference on. IEEE, 971–978. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-301-3_5
Roman Schlegel, Apu Kapadia, and Adam J Lee. 2011. Eyeing your exposure: quan-
tifying and controlling information sharing for improved privacy. In Proceed-
ings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. ACM, 14. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2078827.2078846
Jiayu Shu, Rui Zheng, and Pan Hui. 2016. Cardea: Context-aware visual privacy
protection from pervasive cameras. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00889 (2016).
Julian Steil and Andreas Bulling. 2015. Discovery of Everyday Human Activities
From Long-term Visual Behaviour Using Topic Models. In Proc. ACM International
Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp). 75–85. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2750858.2807520
Julian Steil, Philipp Müller, Yusuke Sugano, and Andreas Bulling. 2018. Forecasting
user attention during everyday mobile interactions using device-integrated and
wearable sensors. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services. ACM, 1. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3229434.3229439
Yusuke Sugano and Andreas Bulling. 2015. Self-Calibrating Head-Mounted Eye
Trackers Using Egocentric Visual Saliency. In Proc. of the 28th ACM Sympo-
sium on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST 2015). 363–372. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2807442.2807445
Yusuke Sugano, Xucong Zhang, and Andreas Bulling. 2016. Aggregaze: Collective
estimation of audience attention on public displays. In Proceedings of the 29th
Annual Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology. ACM, 821–831. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2984511.2984536
Christian Szegedy, Wei Liu, Yangqing Jia, Pierre Sermanet, Scott Reed, Dragomir
Anguelov, Dumitru Erhan, Vincent Vanhoucke, and Andrew Rabinovich. 2015.
Going Deeper with Convolutions. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR). http://arxiv.org/abs/1409.4842
Robert Templeman, Mohammed Korayem, David J Crandall, and Apu Kapadia. 2014.
PlaceAvoider: Steering First-Person Cameras away from Sensitive Spaces. In NDSS.
https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2014.23014
Marc Tonsen, Julian Steil, Yusuke Sugano, and Andreas Bulling. 2017. InvisibleEye:
Mobile Eye Tracking Using Multiple Low-Resolution Cameras and Learning-Based
Gaze Estimation. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and
Ubiquitous Technologies (IMWUT) 1, 3 (2017), 106:1–106:21. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3130971
Khai Truong, Shwetak Patel, Jay Summet, and Gregory Abowd. 2005. Preventing
camera recording by designing a capture-resistant environment. UbiComp 2005:
Ubiquitous Computing (2005), 903–903. https://doi.org/10.1007/11551201_5
Roel Vertegaal et al. 2003. Attentive user interfaces. Commun. ACM 46, 3 (2003), 30–33.
https://doi.org/10.1145/636772.636794
Alan F Westin. 2003. Social and political dimensions of privacy. Journal of social issues
59, 2 (2003), 431–453. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00072
Takayuki Yamada, Seiichi Gohshi, and Isao Echizen. 2013. Privacy visor: Method based
on light absorbing and reflecting properties for preventing face image detection. In
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC), 2013 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
1572–1577. https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC.2013.271
Jun Yu, Baopeng Zhang, Zhengzhong Kuang, Dan Lin, and Jianping Fan. 2017. iPrivacy:
image privacy protection by identifying sensitive objects via deep multi-task learn-
ing. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 12, 5 (2017), 1005–1016.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2016.2636090
PrivacEye: Privacy-Preserving Head-Mounted Eye Tracking Using Egocentric
Scene Image and Eye Movement Features [Supplementary Material]
JULIAN STEIL,Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus
MARION KOELLE, University of Oldenburg
WILKO HEUTEN, OFFIS - Institute for IT
SUSANNE BOLL, University of Oldenburg
ANDREAS BULLING, University of Stuttgart
Eyewear devices, such as augmented reality displays, increasingly integrate eye tracking, but the first-person camera required to map
a user’s gaze to the visual scene can pose a significant threat to user and bystander privacy. We present PrivacEye, a method to detect
privacy-sensitive everyday situations and automatically enable and disable the eye tracker’s first-person camera using a mechanical
shutter. To close the shutter in privacy-sensitive situations, the method uses a deep representation of the first-person video combined
with rich features that encode users’ eye movements. To open the shutter without visual input, PrivacEye detects changes in users’
eye movements alone to gauge changes in the “privacy level” of the current situation. We evaluate our method on a first-person video
dataset recorded in daily life situations of 17 participants, annotated by themselves for privacy sensitivity, and show that our method
is effective in preserving privacy in this challenging setting.
This supplementary document contains a detailed data annotation scheme description, a list of all extracted eye movement fea-
tures, and the full network architecture of our CNN model. Further, we provide a full error case analysis investigating the performance
of PrivacEye in different environments and activities as well as the interview protocol analysing users’ feedback towards PrivacEye.
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing→ Interactive systems and tools; Ubiquitous and mobile computing; Ubiqui-
tous and mobile devices; Human computer interaction (HCI);
Authors’ addresses: Julian Steil, Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus, jsteil@mpi-inf.mpg.de; Marion Koelle, University of
Oldenburg, marion.koelle@uol.de; Wilko Heuten, OFFIS - Institute for IT, wilko.heuten@offis.de; Susanne Boll, University of Oldenburg, susanne.boll@
uol.de; Andreas Bulling, University of Stuttgart, andreas.bulling@vis.uni-stuttgart.de.
2019. Manuscript submitted to ACM
Manuscript submitted to ACM
PrivacEye: Privacy-Preserving Head-Mounted Eye Tracking ETRA ’19, June 25–28, 2019, Denver, CO, USA
1 DATA ANNOTATION SCHEME
Annotations were performed using Advene [Aubert et al. 2012]. Participants were asked to annotate continuous video
segments showing the same situation, environment, or activity. They could also introduce new segments in case a
privacy-relevant feature in the scene changed, e.g., when a participant switched to a sensitive app on the mobile phone.
Participants were asked to annotate each of these segments according to the annotation scheme shown in Table 1,
specifically scene content (Q1-7) and privacy sensitivity ratings (Q8-11). Privacy sensitivity was rated on a 7-point
Likert scale (see Figure 1) ranging from 1 (fully inappropriate) to 7 (fully appropriate). As we expected our participants
to have difficulties understanding the concept of “privacy sensitivity”, we rephrased it for the annotation to “How
appropriate is it that a camera is in the scene?” (Q8).
privacy-
sensitive
non-
sensitive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fig. 1. Sample images showing daily situations ranging from “privacy-sensitive”, such as password entry or social interactions, to
“non-sensitive”, such as walking down a road or sitting in a café.
#Question Example Annotation
1.What is the current environment you are in? office, library, street, canteen
2. Is this an indoor or outdoor environment? indoor, outdoor
3.What is your current activity in the video segment? talking, texting, walking
4. Are private objects present in the scene? schedule, notes, wallet
5. Are devices with potentially sensitive content present in the scene? laptop, mobile phone
6. Is a person present that you personally know? yes, no
7. Is the scene a public or a private place? private, public, mixed
8. How appropriate is it that a camera is in the scene?
9. How appropriate is it that a camera is continuously recording the scene? Likert scale (1: fully inappropriate –
10. How confident are you in a confined sharing (e.g. with friends and relatives) of the
recorded imagery?
7: fully appropriate)
11. How confident are you in a public sharing of the recorded imagery?
Table 1. Annotation scheme used by the participants to annotate their recordings.
2 EYE MOVEMENT FEATURES
Table 2 summarises the features that we extracted from fixations, saccades, blinks, pupil diameter, and a user’s scan
paths. Similar to [Bulling et al. 2011], each saccade is encoded as a character forming words of length n (wordbook). We
extracted these features on a sliding window of 30 seconds (step size of 1 second).
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Fixation (8) rate, mean, max, var of durations, mean/var of var pupil position within one fixation
Saccades (12) rate/ratio of (small/large/right/left) saccades, mean, max, variance of amplitudes
Combined (1) ratio saccades to fixations
Wordbooks (24) number of non-zero entries, max and min entries, and their difference for n-grams with n <= 4
Blinks (3) rate, mean/var blink duration
Pupil Diameter (4) mean/var of mean/var during fixations
Table 2. We extracted 52 eye movement features to describe a user’s eye movement behaviour. The number of features per category
is given in parentheses.
3 CNN NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Inspired by prior work on predicting privacy-sensitive pictures posted in social networks [Orekondy et al. 2017], we
used a pre-trained GoogleNet, a 22-layer deep convolutional neural network [Szegedy et al. 2015]. We adapted the
original GoogleNet model for our specific prediction task by adding two additional fully connected (FC) layers (see
Figure 2). The first layer was used to reduce the feature dimensionality from 1024 to 68 and the second one, a Softmax
layer, to calculate the prediction scores. Output of our model was a score for each first-person image indicating whether
the situation visible in that image was privacy-sensitive or not. The cross-entropy loss was used to train the model.
Ground Truth
Scores
Images
I
GoogleNet
Features: 1024
Feature 
Extraction
Features: 68
...
...
Fully Connected
Layer (FC)
Cross-Entropy
 Loss
Softmax
Predictions
Features: 2
...
Fig. 2. Our method for detecting privacy-sensitive situations is based on a pre-trained GoogleNet model that we adapted with a fully
connected (FC) and a Softmax layer. Cross-entropy loss is used for training the model.
4 ERROR CASE ANALYSIS
For PrivacEye, it is not only important to detect the privacy-sensitive situations (TP), but equally important to detect
non-sensitive situations (TN), which are relevant to grant a good user experience.
Our results suggest that the combination SVM/SVM performs best for the person-specific case. In the following,
we detail its performance on data recorded in different environments and during different activities. We detail on the
occurrence of false positives, i.e., cases where the camera is de-activated in a non-sensitive situation, as well as false
negatives, i.e., cases where the camera remains active although the scene is privacy-sensitive. Examples such as in
Figure 3 show that, while false positives would be rather unproblematic in a realistic usage scenario, false negatives are
critical and might lead to misclosures. Thus, our argumentation focuses on eliminating false negatives. While PrivacEye
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(a) True positives (b) False positives
(c) False negatives (d) True negatives
Fig. 3. Examples for (a) correct detection of “privacy-sensitive” situations, (b) incorrect detection of “non-sensitive” situations, (c)
incorrect detection of “privacy-sensitive” situations, and (d) correct detection of “non-sensitive” situations.
correctly identifies signing a document, social interactions, and screen interactions as privacy-sensitive, false positives
contain reading a book or standing in front of a public display. In these cases PrivacEye would act too restrictively in
cases where de-activating the camera would lead to a loss of functionality (e.g. tracking). False negative cases include,
e.g., reflections (when standing in front of a window), self-luminous screens, or cases that are under-represented in our
data set (e.g. entering a pin at the ATM).
Figure 4 provides a detailed overview of true positives and false negatives with respect to the labelled environments
(Figure 4, left) and activities (Figure 4, right). For each label two stacked bars are shown: PrivacEye’s prediction (top
row) and the ground truth annotation (GT, bottom row). The prediction’s result defines the “cut-off” between closed
shutter (left, privacy-sensitive) and open shutter (right, non-sensitive), which is displayed as vertical bar. Segments that
were predicted to be privacy-sensitive, include both true positives (TP, red) and false positives (FP, yellow-green) are
shown left of the “cut-off”. Similarly, those segments that were predicted to be non-sensitive, including true negatives
(TN, yellow-green) and false negatives (FN, red), are displayed right of the “cut-off”. While false positives (FP) (i.e.,
non-sensitive situations classified as sensitive) are not problematic, as they to not create the risk of misclosures, false
negatives (FN) are critical. Thus, we focus our discussion on the false negatives (red, top, right). A comparison of true
positives (TP) and false negatives (FN) shows that PrivacEye performs well within most environments, e.g., offices or
corridors. In these environments true positives outweigh false negatives. However, in the computer room environment,
where a lot of screens with potentially problematic content (which the wearer might not even be aware of at recording
time) are present, performance drops. Misclassifications between personal displays, e.g., laptops and public displays
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Fig. 4. Error case analysis for different environments (left) and activities (right) showing the “cut-off” between closed shutter (left,
privacy-sensitive) and open shutter (right, non-sensitive) with PrivacEye prediction and the corresponding ground truth (GT). False
positives (FP) are non-sensitive but protected (closed shutter), false negatives (FN) are privacy-sensitive but unprotected (open shutter).
(e.g. room occupancy plans) are a likely reason for the larger amount of false negatives (FN). Future work might
aim to combine PrivacEye with an image-based classifier trained for screen contents (c.f., [Korayem et al. 2016]),
which, however, would come at the cost of excluding also non-sensitive screens from the footage. Future work might
specifically target these situations to increase accuracy. For the activities outlined in Figure 4 (right), PrivacEye works
best while eating/drinking and in media interactions. Also, the results are promising for detecting social interactions. The
performance for password entry, however, is still limited. Although the results show that it is possible to detect password
entry, the amount of true negatives (TN) is comparatively high. This is likely caused by the under-representation of
this activity, which typically lasts only a few seconds in our data set. Future work might be able to eliminate this by
specifically training for password and PIN entry, possibly enabling the classifier to better distinguish between PIN entry
and, e.g., reading.
5 INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
During the interviews, participants were encouraged to interact with state-of-the-art head-mounted displays (Vuzix
M300 and Sony SmartEyeglass) and our prototype. Participants were presented with the fully functional PrivacEye
prototype, which was used to illustrate three scenarios: 1) interpersonal conversations, 2) sensitive objects (a credit
card and a passport), and 3) sensitive contents on a device screen. Due to the time required to gather person-specific
training data for each interviewee as well as runtime restrictions, the scenarios were presented using the Wizard-of-Oz
method. This is also advantageous, as the laboratory-style study environment – with white walls, an interviewer and no
distractors present – might have induced different eye movement patterns than a natural environment. Also, potential
errors of the system, caused by its prototypical implementation, might have caused participant bias toward the concept.
To prevent these issues, the shutter was controlled remotely by an experimental assistant. This way, the interviewees
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commented on the concept and vision of PrivacEye and not on the actual proof-of-concept implementation, which –
complementing the afore-described evaluation – provides a more comprehensive and universal set of results altogether.
The semi-structured interview was based on the following questions:
Q1 Would you be willing to wear something that would block someone from being able to record you?
Q2 If technically feasible, would you expect the devices themselves, instead of their user, to protect your privacy automatically?
Q3 Would you feel different about being around someone who is wearing those kinds of intelligent glasses than about those commercially
available today? Why?
Q4 If you were using AR glasses, would you be concerned about accidentally recording any sensitive information belonging to you?
Q5 How would you feel about (such) a system automatically taking care that you do not capture any sensitive information?
Q6 How do you think the eye tracking works? What can the system infer from your eye data?
Q7 How would you feel about having your eye movements tracked by augmented reality glasses?
The questions were designed following a “funnel principle”, with increasing specificity towards the end of the
interview. We started with four more general questions (not listed above), such as “Do you think recording with those
glasses is similar or different to recording with a cell phone? Why?”, based on [Denning et al. 2014]. This provided
the participant with some time to familiarize herself with the topic before being presented with the proof-of-concept
prototype (use case “bystander privacy”) after Q1 and the use cases “sensitive objects” (e.g., credit card, passport) and
“sensitive data” (e.g. login data) after Q4. Eye tracking functionality was demonstrated after Q5. While acquiescence
and other forms of interviewer effects cannot be ruled out completely, this step-by-step presentation of the prototype
and its scenarios ensured that the participants voiced their own ideas first, before being directed towards discussing
the actual concept of the PrivacEye prototype. Each participant was asked for his/her perspectives on the PrivacEye’s
concept (Q2-Q5) and eye tracking (Q6 and Q7). The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for later analysis.
Subsequently, qualitative analysis was performed following inductive category development [Mayring 2014].
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